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Abstract 
This paper examines key factors influencing the accessibility of microcredit by rural households in China. The 
empirical approach is built upon logistic regression and data are collected through a household survey. A total of 
twelve household-level factors are identified as determinants in households’ access to microcredit and the results 
indicate that households’ accessibility to microcredit can also be impaired by the supply-side factors. The paper 
concludes that households should increase credit demand to expand their access to microcredit. In addition, 
microcredit institutions should improve lending schemes and loan products to better suit the diversified needs of the 
rural population. 
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Credit has been increasingly accepted as a powerful 
instrument to help poor people invest and break out of 
„vicious cycle‟ of poverty because it has the potential 
of improving the users‟ incomes and savings, and 
consequently, enhancing capital accumulation and 
reinforcing high incomes (Atieno, 2001). Despite the 
importance of credit in helping the poor to improve 
their welfare, poor people are excluded from formal 
financial system and such exclusion ranges from partial 
exclusion in developed countries to full or nearly full 
exclusion in less developed countries (LDCs) (Brau 
and Woller, 2004). Traditional financial institutions 
(FIs) are reluctant to serve the poor mainly because 
poor people fail to meet the selection criteria such as 
the requirement of physical collateral set by FIs. The 
perceived high risks and costs arising from processing 
and servicing unsecured small loans also make FIs shy 
away from financing the poor, mainly due to the 
concern of financial viability. Lacking access to formal 
credit, most poor and low-income people continue to 
rely on meagre self-finance or informal credit, which 
limit their ability to actively participate in and benefit 
from the development process. 
As a response to the failure of formal financial sector 
in catering to the poor‟s credit needs, microcredit was 
first initiated in Bangladesh by Professor Muhammad 
Yunus in the late 1970s and has gained a significant 
growth over the past 20 years. Microcredit extends 
small loans (micro loans) to people who are 
traditionally considered unbankable to generate income 
and spur entrepreneurship. Compared to traditional 
lending, microcredit has its own vivid characteristics, 
such as targeting the poor, collateral-free and joint 
liability (or group lending). By removing obstacles in 
traditional lending (such as collateral requirement), 
microcredit largely facilitates the poor‟s access to 
institutional credit when they need financial support. 
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This gives the poor a means of better living, either 
temporarily (such as smoothing seasonal consumption) 
or in the long run (such as creating employment 
opportunities). Due to its great potentials such as 
reducing poverty, microcredit has been promoted as an 
efficient development intervention programme by 
many countries. 
Like most Asian developing countries, the majority of 
the poor population in China dwell in rural areas. There 
are 76 million „relatively‟ poor people surviving on 
less than a dollar per day in rural China and the rural 
population living in both „absolute poverty‟ and 
„relative poverty‟ accounts for 11% of the total rural 
population. Moreover, the rural incomes are just 30% 
of the urban average, which presents a wide gap 
between the rural and urban living standard (Gale, 
Lohmar and Tuan, 2005). Inability to acquire formal 
credit support has constrained poor farmers‟ ability to 
expand their production and improve their living 
conditions. The Chinese collective land-ownership 
system has prevented farmers from accessing 
traditional credit from formal FIs because farmers 
cannot use land as collateral, a necessary requirement 
in traditional lending. However, farmers need credit 
support to meet their living needs including the 
purchase of durable goods, daily consumption, and 
festivals and ceremonies. More importantly, accessing 
affordable agricultural credit allows farmers to adopt 
new technology, which provides them with potential 
economic opportunities to improve production and 
income. Failing to access formal credit, most farmers 
have to resort to informal borrowings which are 
typically offered at higher interest rates. Despite the 
high interests charged by the informal lenders, 
approximately 50% to 60% of rural households in 
China still rely on informal credit for their 
consumption and production (Han, 2004). However, 
the high interest of informal loans have increased the 
farmers‟ indebtedness and further kept most of the 
households trapped in poverty. 
Since China agriculture is dominated by small farms 
and farmer households are the basic units of 
agricultural production
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, limited access to formal credit 
has long been blamed as a key restraint in expanding 
farmers‟ production and improving their livelihood, 
which potentially leads to the stagnant growth of the 
rural economy (Park, Ren and Wang, 2004; Cheng and 
Xu, 2004). With a widening gap between rural and 
urban living standards and the growing awareness of 
the significance of agriculture, the Chinese government 
carried out various agriculture-support policies 
focusing on farmer lending to solve „three rural 
problems‟, namely raising rural incomes, improving 
agricultural production, and developing rural areas. 
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 Before the economic reform initiated in the late 1970s, the 
Chinese agricultural economy was characterised as collective 
economy, of which the basic production unit was production 
team. The most successful reform since 1970s was the shift 
from the collective system to the household responsibility 
system (HRS) which restored the primacy of individual 
household as the basic unit of production in rural China. 
Under the circumstances, microcredit was introduced 
into China as part of the government‟s poverty 
alleviation strategies in the mid-1990s, aiming to 
ameliorate rural poverty through a financially 
sustainable approach. Different types of organisations 
have been involved in implementing microcredit 
programmes in China, including non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or quasi-official organisations, 
government agencies, and formal rural financial 
institutions (RFIs) such as the Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs). In terms of different providers, 
China microcredit programmes can be categorised as 
three types. The first type includes experimental 
microcredit projects provided by NGOs and quasi-
official organisations, aiming to explore the feasibility, 
operating capabilities and policy implications of 
microcredit in China; the second type focuses on 
poverty alleviation carried out by government 
agencies; and the third type centres on RCCs with the 
purpose of minimising credit constraint in the rural 
areas of China (Du, 2005, 2004). Since implementing 
microcredit programmes in 2000, RCCs have quickly 
expanded their microcredit activities with an extensive 
network in rural areas and take the leading role in 
popularising and formalising microcredit in China. 
With the implementation of microcredit, China has 
boosted lending to farmers in recent years. For 
example, the balance of outstanding agricultural loans 
by RCCs has been more than doubled between 2001 
and 2005, with a balance equivalent to $127 billion in 
2005 (Gale and Collender, 2006). Under the 
agricultural lending support from the People‟s Bank of 
China (PBC) which is the main funding source for 
RCCs‟ microcredit programmes, RCCs have 
substantially developed their microcredit programmes 
and evolved as the largest microcredit providers 
serving the grassroots level in rural China. However, in 
spite of the strong efforts made by the Chinese 
government to facilitate credit access in rural areas, 
there are evidences showing that a large number of 
poor households who are regarded as marginalised 
people in their villages do not have access to 
microcredit because of their weak social and economic 
conditions. In addition, women in rural China are still 
disadvantaged in accessing any form of formal credit 
including microcredit and in some occasions, they have 
to use their husbands‟ names to apply for microcredit 
loans (Han, 2004; Unger, 2002). A relevant question 
arises: What kind of factors, household-level or 
institution-level, are likely to influence rural 
households‟ accessibility to microcredit in China? 
Unfortunately, few empirical studies have been 
conducted in this regard. 
This paper aims to empirically analyse households‟ 
accessibility to microcredit to identify the key factors 
affecting the access to microcredit. The microcredit 
programme studied in this paper is carried out by the 
RCC, the largest microcredit provider in China. 
Outperforming the programmes operated by NGOs and 
government agencies in terms of outreach and financial 
sustainability, RCC‟s microcredit programme is the 
most prevailing type in rural China. The remainder of 
the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an 
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overview of rural credit market in China. Section 3 
discusses the research methodology and data 
collection. The research results are discussed in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
Rural Credit Market in China 
The rural credit market in China share similar features 
with those found in many other developing countries: 
the market is fragmented, where formal and informal 
credit sources coexist; formal credit is highly regulated 
but difficult to access by rural households; informal 
lending is more readily accessed but always appears to 
be clandestine and considered illegal (Jia, Heidhues, 
and Zeller, 2007). Since the economic reform initiated 
in the late 1970s, there has been a gradual 
improvement in China‟s rural financial system, aiming 
to gear the system towards meeting the diversified 
financial needs of the rural and agricultural sectors. 
The current formal rural financial sector is 
characterised as a “three-tier system”, composed of a 
state-owned commercial bank (Agricultural Bank of 
China), a government policy-based bank (Agricultural 
Development Bank of China), and Rural Credit 
Cooperative (RCC). Each of the three RFIs plays a 
unique role in providing lending support to the 
agricultural sector and rural households in China.  
The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) is the largest 
commercial bank involved in agriculture. Loans from 
the ABC include specialised agricultural loans (such as 
comprehensive development and subsidiary businesses 
in grain, oil, and cotton), conventional agricultural 
loans (such as farming, forestry, livestock, fisheries, 
and the processing of agricultural products), loans for 
township and village enterprises (TVEs), loans for 
rural supply and marketing co-operatives (SMCs), and 
for basic rural facilities construction. As a policy bank, 
the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) 
primarily operates the agriculture-related financial 
businesses regulated by the State, such as the supply 
and management of funds for the procurement of 
selected agricultural products. Specifically, loans 
(above 90%) from the ADBC are issued to the state-
owned enterprises for the purchase, storage and 
marketing of important agricultural products including 
grain, cotton and oil (Han, 2004; He and Guo, 2004; 
Druschel, 2002).  
The RCCs are financial cooperative institution with 
rural labourers as share-holding members and operate 
at either village-level or township-level. The township-
level RCCs can run both savings and credit businesses 
but the village-level RCCs are only allowed to take in 
deposits from villagers, plus collecting loan 
applications and submitting them to township-level 
RCCs for approval. Since the start-up capital of RCCs 
comes from farmers (80% or more of RCCs‟ funding 
comes from farmers‟ savings deposits), RCCs have a 
close relationship with farmers and loans provided by 
RCCs principally target rural households (Druschel, 
2002; Guo and Lei, 2000). Loans issued to rural 
households are mostly in the form of microcredit, 
giving key support to crop production, fish breeding, 
raising animals, as well as children‟s education and 
daily consumption (PBC, 2001).  
The three major financial institutions within the 
system, i.e., ABC, ADBC, and RCC, perform their own 
functions in regards to commercial, policy, and co-
operative finance. The Chinese government has placed 
high emphasis of the important role played by 
agriculture in the national economy and realised that 
agricultural credit is an efficient way of channelling 
more cash into the rural economy to boost production 
and raise rural incomes. Encouraged by the 
government, the RFIs have substantially increased the 
agricultural lending during the past two decades, 
manifested by the total loan amount granted by all RFIs 
rising from 45.4 billion yuan in 1979 to 3238.7 billion 
yuan in 2000. In particular, the total amount of RCCs‟ 
loans (which are issued mostly towards rural 
households) rose from 4.8 billion yuan in 1979 to 
1048.9 billion yuan in 2000, indicating a 218-fold 
increase (Han, 2004). 
Despite the evident achievements in agricultural 
lending made by the RFIs, the RFIs have been heavily 
criticised for being unable to satisfy the various credit 
needs of the rural households in China. The access to 
institutional credit by the rural households remains 
constrained. Such constraint can be partly attributed to 
the insufficient credit supply by RFIs in rural China. 
The credit insufficiency mainly arises from the lack of 
RFIs providing financial services to farmers. Although 
the ABC and ADBC both serve the rural areas, they 
mainly focus on agricultural product processing 
companies and large-scale agricultural development 
projects run by the state government, and do not issue 
loans to farmers (Druschel, 2002). As a result, the RCC 
is the only RFI serving the grassroots of rural society 
with the provision of financial services, especially after 
other financial institutions such as the ABC have 
largely withdrawn their financial services from rural 
areas to target more profitable operations in urban 
areas. However, there are only about 40,000 RCCs 
across the country and the credit supply by RCCs is 
inadequate to meet the considerable credit demand 
required by the enormous rural households in China 
(Gale and Collender, 2006; Ma, 2004). The insufficient 
credit supply is further exacerbated by the increasing 
financial losses of RFIs resulted from the capped 
lending rates set by the PBC, which has crippled the 
RFIs‟ ability to provide credit support to rural 
households. The low lending rates usually cannot 
generate sufficient revenues for RFIs to make profit 
given the high transaction and operational costs 
incurred in lending to farmers (Cheng and Xu, 2004). 
Apart from the shortage of credit supply, households‟ 
accessibility to formal credit has been severely 
weakened by the lending terms and procedures set by 
the RFIs. Collateral requirement is the most frequently-
mentioned obstacle that prevents poor households from 
accessing formal credit. To address the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazards arising from 
asymmetric information between banks and borrowers, 
banks usually attach collateral requirements to loans. 
Collateral is used to assist in determining 
creditworthiness, as well as solving the incentive and 
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enforcement problems (Klein, Meyer, Hannig, Burnett, 
and Fiebig, 1999). Such collateral requirement 
becomes more stringent when the borrower is resource-
poor.  
Land is always a preferred form of collateral in formal 
agricultural lending. However, farmers in China do not 
have the ownership of the land on which they farm. 
Instead, farmland is owned by villages and distributed 
on an egalitarian basis among village members. The 
lack of land ownership equals the lack of proper 
collateral, which makes formal credit inaccessible to 
China‟s farmers (Gale and Collender, 2006; Unger, 
2002). In addition to the lack of appropriate collateral, 
the high borrowing costs borne by the Chinese farmers 
keep them away from formal credit. Other than loan 
interest, farmers‟ borrowing costs consist of the time 
spent on travelling and on loan applications, gifts and 
kickbacks to loan officers, and the membership fees. 
The long and complicated loan application procedures 
have often dampened farmers since it tends to 
jeopardize productive investment opportunities when 
quick credit is required. It is also quite common for 
loan applicants to invite loan officers to banquets 
and/or give kickbacks directly to loan officers for loan 
approvals. In the case of RCCs, households have to pay 
membership fees (usually $7 to $20) to RCCs before 
they can lodge their loan applications (Cheng and Xu, 
2004). 
Failing to secure credit support from formal financial 
institutions, the majority of poor farmers have to fall 
back on informal sources to meet their credit needs. 
Informal credit in China includes loans obtained from 
non-commercial sources such as friends, relatives and 
acquaintances, and loans from private lending and 
borrowing organisations (PLBs), such as professional 
moneylenders, traders, pawnbrokers and usurers. PLB 
is the dominant source of informal finance in rural 
China (Han, 2004; Cheng and Xu, 2004). Tilakaratna 
(1996) estimates that the share of informal loans in the 
total borrowing by the rural sector in developing 
countries ranges from 30 percent to more than 80 
percent. In the case of China, informal credit has 
become the main source of credit among the rural 
population, accounting for more than 70% of the 
farmers‟ total borrowing (Ma, 2004). While the 
farmers‟ credit needs for daily consumption can be met 
by borrowing from their friends and relatives free of 
charge, the needs for production are largely met by 
borrowing from PLBs with high interest rates (Wang 
and Liu, 2005). Compared to formal financing, 
informal financing possesses some advantages, such as 
close personal relationships with clients, flexibility, 
rapidity and low transaction costs, which make 
informal finance either the exclusive or the preferred 
credit source in rural areas despite exploitative interest 
rates (Cheng and Xu, 2004). However, informal 
lenders normally depend on personal funds and the 
limited resources restrict the extent to which the 
informal lenders can effectively and sustainably satisfy 
the credit needs of their borrowers. The limited credit 
supply by informal lenders then leads to either severe 
credit constraints or usurious loans for some borrowers 
(Atieno, 2001). 
Informal finance remains controversial in China‟s rural 
financial construction. On the one hand, there are 
opponents who traditionally regard informal finance as 
a violation of normal financial discipline in China 
despite its contribution to meeting farmers‟ urgent 
financial needs. The evidence supporting such 
argument is that the Chinese government never gives 
overt recognition to the legal existence of the informal 
sector and the development of informal credit is 
generally clandestine and out of the government‟s 
supervision (Jia et al., 2007; Ma, 2004). The opponents 
suggest excluding informal credit from rural financial 
markets by improving the lending operations of formal 
financial institutions to provide more loans in favour of 
rural households, which is crucial in establishing a 
sound rural financial system and maintaining the 
sustainable development of China‟s rural economy. 
However, advocates of informal finance contend that 
the existence of informal credit in China reflects the 
imperfections of China‟s formal rural financing system, 
which is characterised as unable to meet the diverse 
capital demands of the rural households. If no changes 
are made in the current situation, the persistence of 
informal credit will be both necessary and rational in 
view of the credit facilities provided to the farmers 
(Ayyagari, Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008; Guo and Lei, 
2000). 
Research Methodology and Data 
Conceptual framework and empirical model 
Household‟s accessibility to credit can be defined as 
the ability to borrow from different sources of credit 
(Diagne and Zeller, 2001; Diagne, 1999). Evans, 
Adams, Mohammed, and Norris (1999) present a 
conceptual framework in analysing factors that affect 
households‟ accessibility to microcredit in Bangladesh, 
in which both household-related factors and 
programme-related factors are taken into account. 
Similarly, Vaessen (2001) examines households‟ 
accessibility to rural credit in Northern Nicaragua by 
analysing both demand-side (households) factors and 
supply-side (lenders) factors. This paper employs 
Evans et al.‟s (1999) conceptual framework to 
investigate households‟ accessibility to microcredit in 
rural China by focusing on the microcredit programme 
implemented by the Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs).  
Household-related factors (such as income, occupation, 
age, education) are hypothesised to affect households‟ 
demand for microcredit, which can directly influence 
households‟ accessibility to microcredit. This is 
because households‟ access to a certain type of credit 
can be conceptualised as a sequential decision making 
process that is initiated at the demand side (Zeller, 
1994). In addition to household-related factors, there 
are programme-related (supply-side) factors 
influencing the households‟ access to microcredit too. 
For example, Umoh (2006) argues that the 
inaccessibility to credit is generally created by the 
lending policies of financial institutions, which can be 
manifested by complicated application procedures, 
specified minimum loan amount and prescribed loan 
purpose. In addition, some features unique to 
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microcredit programmes can also constrain 
households‟ access to microcredit, including 
membership requirement, self-selected credit group, 
and group lending (see for example, Maes and Foose, 
2006; Evans et al., 1999). Institutional incentives such 
as achieving repayment target and ensuring programme 
financial viability may induce the lenders shy away 
from lending to households who are or appear to be 
risky borrowers (Maes and Foose, 2006; Evans et al., 
1999). 
Due to the supply-related factors, households who have 
a demand for microcredit may access microcredit or 
stay frustrated by denial. Therefore, household-related 
factors and programme-related factors, singly or in 
combination, can work to impact households‟ 
accessibility to microcredit. This paper attempts to 
measure households‟ accessibility to microcredit by 
empirically examining the influence of household 
factors on the probability of securing micro loans from 
the RCCs. Data used in the empirical analysis includes 
primary data collected from a rural household survey in 
China (data collection is discussed in the subsequent 
section). The influence of institution-level factors (i.e., 
supply side factors) on households‟ accessibility to 
microcredit is examined descriptively with qualitative 
information collected from the household survey. 
Furthermore, this paper assumes that rural households 
in China prefer microcredit to other credit types such as 
formal credit and informal credit when they need to 
borrow, due to the merits of microcredit such as 
collateral free and affordable interest rates (RCC‟s 
micro loans are provided at commercial rates). 
Previous studies have identified a variety of household-
level factors that influence households‟ ability to 
access a certain type of credit. For example, Mohamed 
(2003) conducted an empirical study examining the 
accessibility to formal and quasi-formal credit by 
farmers in Zanzibar, where socio-economic 
characteristics of rural households such as age, gender, 
education attainment, and income level are identified as 
determinants affecting farmers‟ access to formal credit. 
In addition to age, gender, and education level, Okurut 
(2006) found that household characteristics such as 
residence location, family size, and household 
expenditure also have significant effects on 
households‟ access to different types of credit (formal, 
semi-formal and informal) in South Africa. Vaessen 
(2001) further pointed out that household access to 
networks of recommendation/information plays a 
crucial role in obtaining formal credit by households. 
In our study, household variables encompass household 
demographics (such as age and gender), socio-
economic factors (such as income level and assets 
ownership) and other household-related factors (such 
as attitude towards debt and ability to access other 
sources of credit). Table 1 presents the definitions of 
variables used in the empirical model. 
Insert Table 1 here 
The empirical approach used to analyse accessibility to 
microcredit from the perspective of rural households is 
based on binary choice models which describe the 
probability of households‟ choice between two 
mutually exclusive alternatives (accessing or not 
accessing) according to their evaluations of the utilities 
of these two choices (Umoh, 2006; Train, 2003). Let 
Un (Yn, Xn) be the utility function of household n, where 
Yn is a dichotomous variable denoting whether the 
household has access to microcredit (1 if yes; 0 
otherwise); Xn
 
is a vector of household characteristics. 
The household will choose to borrow from microcredit 
programme if such choice implies a higher utility level 
compared to not borrowing: 
U1n (Yn = 1, Xn) > U0n (Yn = 0, Xn)              (1) 
Consequently, the probability that household n chooses 
to access microcredit can be written as: 
Pn (Yn = 1) = Pr (U1n > U0n)              (2) 
Logit model and probit model are two binary choice 
models commonly used in analysing households‟ 
accessibility to credit in the literature. For example, 
Mohamed (2003) and Vaessen (2001) employed logit 
model to examine the relative importance of household 
factors in determining the probability of accessing 
different types of credit, while Okurut (2006) and 
Umoh (2006) opted for probti model for their empirical 
analyses. Both logit and probit models provide 
consistent, efficient, and asymptotically normal 
estimates, and yield very similar prediction results in 
empirical work. Instead of trying to determine the 
household‟s choice, this paper utilises the observed 
information of household‟s choice (borrow or not 
borrow) and household‟s characteristics to estimate the 
probability of the household‟s choice conditional on 
the household characteristics using logit model, owing 
to the merits possessed by logit model such as 
approximating the normal distribution quite well and 
analytical convenience (Train, 2003; Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1985). The empirical model is specified as 
follows: 
( )
( 1) 1 [1 ]n
X
n nP Y e
                  (3) 
where: Yn is dependent variable, equal to 1 if the 
household has secured microcredit from RCCs and 0 
otherwise; Pn is the estimated probability of a 
household having access to microcredit. 
Equation (3) represents the cumulative logistic 
distribution function in a non-linear form, which gives 
rise to the difficulty in interpreting the coefficients. For 
the purpose of interpretation, it is normal to write the 
model in terms of log-odds ratio (Maddala, 2001). 
With a logit transformation, the estimated model 
becomes a linear function of the explanatory variables, 
which is expressed as follows: 
[ ( 1)] log{ (1 )}n n n n nlogit P Y P P X                 (4) 
where: α is a constant term; 
β is a vector of coefficients for the 
independent variables Xn; 
Xn is a vector of independent variables (see 
Table 1), including household‟s 
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demographics, socio-economic characteristics 
and other household-related factors. 
Data collection 
The data include primary data collected through a rural 
household survey which was personally conducted 
between November 2008 and January 2009 in Hubei 
Province in China. Hubei Province is one of the major 
agricultural provinces in China, where farmers are 
geographically distributed in both plain areas and 
mountain areas and take on various agricultural 
productions such as crop, aquatic products and 
livestock. There are a total of 1,470 RCC branches 
located in towns throughout Hubei and at least 60% 
have been engaged in micro-financing since RCC 
initiated microcredit programme in the Province in 
2002 (RCC Hubei Head office, 2008). According to the 
statistics from RCC Hubei Head Office, the amount of 
micro loans granted to rural households by RCCs has 
totalled 10.1 billion yuan at the end of 2006 and 4.28 
million rural households have obtained micro loans, 
accounting for 43% of the total rural households in 
Hubei. 
A structured questionnaire was used to elicit relevant 
household information, such as age, gender, household 
size, etc., which is used in the logit model to identify 
key household-level factors that influence microcredit 
accessibility among rural population. In addition, the 
questionnaire gathered qualitative information, such as 
knowledge of RCC microcredit programme, reasons 
for not applying for micro loans as well as for loan 
rejection, etc., for the purpose of investigating the 
influence of other factors (such as institutional factors) 
on households‟ accessibility to microcredit in the 
descriptive analysis. 
A multi-stage stratified random sampling technique 
was applied to draw the household sample. In the first 
stage of sampling process, sample townships were 
selected on the basis of the availability of RCC 
microcredit programme. A total of 10 townships were 
selected from the 768 townships hosting RCC‟s 
programme, where 3 of the 10 selected townships are 
located in mountain areas while the rest are situated in 
plain areas. Following the selection of sample 
townships, sample villages were selected. A total of 5 
villages from every selected township were randomly 
chosen and altogether 50 villages were included. The 
selection of sample households was accomplished in 
the final stage of sampling process. The household 
selection included two steps: the first step was to select 
households who have accessed RCC‟s microcredit 
(namely borrowers). Based on the borrower list 
obtained from each RCC branch office in the selected 
township, a total of 328 borrowers were randomly 
chosen to participate in the interview. Subsequent to 
the selection of borrowers, another 96 households who 
have never secured RCC‟s microcredit (namely non-
borrowers) were randomly selected from a list of rural 
households obtained from the village committee office 
in each selected village. Overall, 424 households were 
included in the sample for the survey and all 
respondents are heads of households
2
. 
Research Results and Discussions 
Characteristics of the rural households 
Table 2 summarises the household characteristics used 
in the analysis for the whole sample according to the 
status of respondents‟ access to microcredit. The t-test 
is used to test whether the mean values of household 
variables between borrowers and non-borrowers are 
statistically different, and the chi-square test is to test 
the relationship (independent or not) between the non-
metric household variables and access to microcredit. 
Our results show that the t-test results are not 
statistically significantly at 10 percent level, except for 
ASSET. In addition, the households‟ access to 
microcredit is strongly associated with GEND, EDU, 
SELFEMPL, FARMSZ, LOCATN, DIST, SAV, 
ATTITUD, and ALTER because the chi-square tests on 
these variables are all significant at the 10 percent level 
or better. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Out of the 424 sampled household heads, 328 are 
microcredit borrowers of RCC. Our results in Table 2 
show that the overall mean age for the sample is 
around 41 years old and the average age of the 
borrower and non-borrower respondents is identical. In 
terms of gender, the sample comprises 332 (78.3%) 
male household heads and 92 (21.7%) female 
household heads. Approximately 79.5% of the sampled 
male household heads are borrowers of RCC 
microcredit programme and 69.6% of the sampled 
female household heads are engaged in the micro 
borrowing. However, the borrowers group mainly 
consist of males. 
The survey respondents are divided into three groups 
with respect to educational attainment, including 
without education, secondary school education or less, 
and post-secondary education.  The data in Table 2 
shows that vast majority of the respondents have 
obtained some education and only 3.8% of the 
respondents reported having no education. The 
proportion of not being educated for the borrowers is 
only 1.8%, much lower than that for the non-borrowers 
(10.4%). Around 92.4% of the borrowers and 80.2% of 
the non-borrowers have acquired secondary education 
or less (including primary, middle and high school). 
However, in terms of post-secondary education 
(college and university), the non-borrowers appear to 
be better educated than the borrowers (9.4% versus 
5.8%). 
On average the sampled households have 4 family 
members and the survey results do not show much 
variation in the average household size between the 
                                                 
2 RCC‟s micro loans are issued to the households only under 
the name of household heads, so all borrower respondents are 
household heads. In order to elicit information from similar 
perceptions, the non-borrower respondents are also heads 
from the non-borrowing household. 
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two groups of households. Only a small portion 
(24.3%) of the respondents is engaged in self-
employment as evidenced by our survey results. The 
results also suggest that the borrower respondents are 
more likely to take up self-business compared to the 
non-borrower respondents (26.5% versus 18.7%). The 
χ2 test (equals 3.92) indicates a strong association 
between households‟ access to microcredit and self-
employment engagement (see Table 2). 
The economic dependency ratio (EDR), calculated as 
the ratio of household members without income to 
household income earners, reflects the economic 
activity of a household. Households with higher EDRs 
will be more financially stressed than those with lower 
ratios. According to this ratio, the non-borrowing 
households appears to be relatively more economic 
active than the borrowing households because the 
proportion of non-borrowing households with EDRs 
higher than 1.0 is lower than that of the borrowing 
households (16.7 versus 22.6). The t-test (equals -0.73) 
does not suggest a significant mean difference between 
the two group households. 
A total of 323 respondents (76.2%) rely on agriculture 
(crop farming, raising livestock, fishery, etc.) as their 
major source of income while only 14 of the 
respondents (3.3%) are engaged in non-agricultural 
income-generating activities. Approximately 22.3% of 
the borrowing households earn income from both 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities, whereas 
14.6% of the non-borrowing households source their 
income from non-agricultural activities in addition to 
agriculture production. The average annual income and 
assets value for the sampled household is 47,920 yuan 
and 12,592 yuan respectively. The t-test further 
indicates a significant mean difference (at the 5 percent 
level) in the household assets value between the 
borrowers and non-borrowers (see Table 2).  
All of the respondents do not own farmland. The 
overwhelming majority (91.7%) of the respondents 
contract their farming land from villages while 8.3% 
farm on the leased land. In terms of farm size, up to 
three quarters of the respondents work on farms no 
larger than 10 mus. In addition, the proportion of the 
borrowing households who work on large farms (size 
larger than 10 mus) is 29%, which is more than two 
times higher than that of the non-borrowing households 
(13.5%). This implies that households with larger farm 
sizes are more likely to become RCC‟s microcredit 
borrowers. 
The geographic distribution of the respondents in Table 
2 shows that nearly two thirds of the non-borrowing 
households live in mountain regions. In addition, the 
proportion of the borrowing households who live 
within 10 lis from the RCC branches is higher than that 
of the non-borrowing households (62.5 versus 52.1) 
and the share of the borrowers living more than 20 lis 
from the RCC branches is lower compared to the non-
borrowers (4.6 versus 15.6). This suggests that 
households who live physically closer to the RCC 
branches are more likely to access RCC‟s microcredit. 
 
Less than half of the respondents have saving accounts 
in RCC branches. Compared to the borrowers, the non 
borrowers appear to be more inclined to deposit money 
with RCCs (61.5% versus 42.4%). In addition, majority 
(78.3%) of the respondents do not hold RCCs shares 
with relatively higher proportion of shareholding 
observed in the non-borrower group
3
. Similarly, only a 
small portion (13.4%) of the respondents has one or 
more family members working as government 
official(s). About 14.6% of the non-borrowing 
households have family member(s) with official status, 
which is slightly higher than that of the borrowing 
households (13.1%). 
Finally, the frequency distributions of ATTITUD and 
ALTER in Table 2 show that the non-borrower 
respondents are generally more averse to having debt 
and more able to access alternative credit sources when 
they need to borrow, compared to the borrower 
respondents. 
Determinants of household accessibility to 
microcredit in China 
Logistic regression (equation 3) is conducted to 
investigate household-level factors that influence 
households‟ accessibility to microcredit and estimated 
via maximum likelihood estimation technique. Table 3 
presents the estimated results of the logistic model. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Overall the logistic model successfully predicts the 
possibility of households‟ microcredit access (82.31 
percent). The likelihood ratio test with chi-square 
statistic equal to 130 with 18 degrees of freedom fails 
to accept the null hypothesis that the parameter 
estimates for the model are equal to zero, at the 1 
percent level of significance. It can be concluded that 
the explanatory power of the logistic model is 
satisfactory and the model can be used to explain the 
probability of accessing RCC‟s microcredit by the rural 
households. 
Based on the estimated results, twelve variables are 
found to have significant influence on households‟ 
accessibility to RCC‟s microcredit, including DIST2, 
HHSZ, EDU1, INCOME, SELFEMPL, EDR, ASSET, 
SAV, ATTITUD, ALTER, OFFICIAL and SHAREHLD. 
The significant positive sign on INCOME variable 
indicates that households with higher annual income 
have higher probability of accessing RCC microcredit. 
One possible reason for this result is that high income 
households tend to have more investment 
opportunities, leading to stronger potential need of 
credit support. High-income households may also be 
more confident in repaying loans if they borrow. 
Therefore, they are more inclined to access 
microcredit. On the contrary, the significant negative 
                                                 
3 RCC was established in the late 1950s with funds invested 
by rural households as its establishment funding. Since then 
RCC has maintained this tradition and encouraged rural 
household to buy shares. Households who have shares in 
RCC then become shareholders of RCC. 
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sign on ASSET variable implies that households‟ 
accessibility to microcredit decreases with increased 
assets values. This is because assets correspond to 
household initial capital. The households with higher 
assets values may be less budget constrained and 
therefore less likely to borrow from microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) such as RCCs.  
The significant positive sign on EDU1 dummy variable 
indicates that households who have acquired secondary 
school education or less have higher probability to 
access microcredit than the uneducated households, 
holding other factors constant. This relationship is 
expected because farmers with formal education (for 
example, secondary or post-secondary school) are 
likely to have more exposure to the external 
environment including risks and possess more skills, 
and therefore they might require more credit for 
consumption and/or production, compared to the 
uneducated farmers. In contrast, a significant but 
negative relationship is found between variable HHSZ 
and households‟ accessibility to microcredit, 
suggesting that the larger-size households are less 
likely to borrow from RCC‟s microcredit programme. 
This is possibly because larger-size households tend to 
have low repayment capacity resulting from the smaller 
future expected income per capita, which lowers the 
probability of borrowing. This finding contradicts to 
Ho (2004) and Vaessen‟s (2001) findings who 
conclude that the probability of accessing formal credit 
increases with household size. 
The estimated coefficients of variables DIST2, 
ATTITUD, and ALTER are all negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
Holding other factors constant, the households residing 
more than 20 lis from RCC branches have significantly 
lower probability to access RCC microcredit compared 
to those who live within 10 lis from RCC branches, 
mainly due to the perceived high borrowing costs 
arising from the travelling expenses and time 
opportunity costs. In addition, an adverse attitude 
towards having debt could decrease the likelihood of 
accessing any type of credit by households, including 
microcredit. Furthermore, the availability of other 
credit sources (such as informal credit) also tends to 
reduce the probability of borrowing from RCC 
microcredit programme. This finding is consistent with 
Vaessen (2001) who observes that many poor 
households are more willing to use informal credit 
owing to low transaction costs and flexible loan 
contracts. 
The positive and significant sign on variable 
SELFEMPL indicates that the probability of accessing 
microcredit can be significantly improved when 
households get involved in self-business apart from 
agriculture production. This can be explained by the 
higher capital requirement for investing in self 
enterprises. The results show that official status 
(OFFICIAL) is also a contributor to households‟ access 
to microcredit. One possible reason is that households 
with members working as village or township officials 
have greater need of credit for off-farm investment and 
thus have higher probability of accessing microcredit. 
Households with members working as local officials 
may also access RCC‟s microcredit easier due to their 
good relationship with the local financial institutions 
such as RCC. 
Variables EDR, SAV, and SHAREHLD are found to 
significantly influence households‟ accessibility to 
microcredit in an unexpected way. The estimated 
coefficient of EDR is positive, implying that the 
households who are less economic active have higher 
probability of being engaged in RCC microcredit 
programme. One possible explanation for this 
unexpected relationship is that households with higher 
dependency ratios have less family members taking up 
income-generating activities and thus are more inclined 
to rely on loans for household activities such as 
consumption and children education due to insufficient 
income. As a result, they are more likely to access 
RCC‟s microcredit. The inverse relationship between 
SAV and households‟ accessibility suggests that 
households who deposit money with RCCs have lower 
probability to access RCC‟s microcredit. This is 
possible since these households are able to access their 
savings in RCCs when they need financial support, 
which in turn weaken the likelihood of borrowing 
micro loans from RCC. Similarly, the households who 
bought shares of RCC are likely to have more surplus 
money in their own control, which reduces their 
intentions to borrow. This might account for the 
negative relationship between SHAREHLD and 
households‟ access to RCC‟s microcredit. 
The marginal effects are also calculated for the 
regressors of the logit model to provide a direct 
economic interpretation on the influence of these 
variables on households‟ accessibility to microcredit. 
The results are also summarised in Table 3. For 
example, the marginal effect of HHSZ indicates that an 
additional member increase in the family would 
decrease the probability of accessing microcredit by 
2.36 percent on average. In addition, the probability of 
borrowing from RCC microcredit programme would 
increase by 0.12 percent with every 1,000 yuan 
increase in INCOME. By contrast, an additional 1,000 
yuan increase in ASSET would reduce households‟ 
probability of accessing RCC microcredit by 0.64 
percent. This however indicates that the marginal 
effects of both INCOME and ASSET on the probability 
of accessing microcredit are minimal. Furthermore, the 
marginal effect of SELFEMPL shows that being 
engaged in self employment would enhance the 
probability of borrowing from the programme by 
5.47percent. Similarly, the probability of accessing 
microcredit for households with members working as 
local officials increases by 7.24 percent. However, the 
marginal effects of ATTITUD and ALTER suggest that 
the probability of accessing microcredit would decrease 
by 16.76 percent when the household holds a negative 
attitude towards debt, and by 10.02 percent when the 
household can find alternative credit sources other than 
RCC microcredit. 
Other factors affecting households’ 
accessibility to microcredit 
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Some qualitative information was also gathered from 
the household survey to investigate factors affecting 
the households‟ access to microcredit in rural China, 
other than those empirically analysed. 
Knowledge of RCC microcredit programme  
From the 96 non-borrower respondents, 28 respondents 
reported that they had no knowledge about the 
microcredit programme operated by RCC. Three main 
reasons are found in such lack of knowledge. One of 
the most cited reasons is the lack of understanding of 
the concept „microcredit‟ (60.7%). This is followed by 
the inadequate promotion of microcredit programme by 
RCC (21.4%) and the unawareness of the RCC 
branches nearby (17.9%). 
Need to borrow 
The survey results show that 77% (n=74) of the total 
non-borrower respondents had no need to borrow 
money in the past two years. This further confirms that 
credit demand determines households‟ access to 
microcredit to a large extent. For the other 22 non-
borrowers who signalled credit needs, 18 had applied 
for micro loans from RCCs but rejected, and 4 had 
resorted to either formal lenders (e.g., Agricultural 
Bank of China) or informal lenders (e.g., friends, 
relatives). 
Reasons for loan rejection 
The 18 non-borrower respondents whose loan 
applications were rejected were asked to provide 
reasons why they were denied loans. The result 
reported that ten (55.6%) of the respondents attributed 
the loan rejections to their poor repayment capacity 
arising from low household income. Inability to 
provide loan security (e.g., collateral or co-signer) was 
also mentioned by 10 of the respondents as an adverse 
factor in their loan application. Moreover, 33% of the 
respondents deemed their failure in securing micro 
loans as a result of their blemished credit history 
caused by previous loans defaults. This implies that 
creditworthiness potentially impacts the households‟ 
access to microcredit. Furthermore, 28% of the 
respondents report that the difficulty in meeting the 
required documents by the RCC loan officers also 
prevented them from accessing microcredit. 
Reasons for not applying micro loans 
All the non-borrower respondents (n=96) were asked 
whether they need to borrow in the future and if they 
have to, would they apply for micro loans from RCCs. 
The result reported that 83 of the non-borrowers 
signalled borrowing intention in the future, of whom 53 
expressed that they would give priority to RCC micro 
loans if they have credit needs. The remaining 30 
respondents who indicated unwillingness to access 
RCC‟s microcredit programme were further asked to 
provide reasons why they do not borrow from RCC. 
Income is found to be a determinant in the households‟ 
future borrowing from RCC microcredit programme. 
The result reported that 66.7% (n=20) of the 
households would not borrow because their meagre 
income is not sufficient to repay loans. In addition, 
50% (n=15) of the respondents mentioned that the 
interest rate of RCC micro loans is set too high to 
afford, which is another crucial factor that restrains the 
households from applying micro loans. Similarly, 15 
non-borrower respondents prefer informal loans over 
RCC micro loans because the former can be easily 
obtained. Other reasons include complicated 
application procedure adopted by RCC in terms of 
documents requirement and processing time (43.3%), 
lack of proper collateral (33.3%), and poor credit 
records (26.7%). 
Conclusions 
This study examines the key factors that influence the 
accessibility of microcredit by rural households in 
China. Overall, our results suggest that rural 
households (especially the poor) and women in China 
have limited access to institutional credit including the 
microcredit provided by RCC. The empirical analysis 
based on the logistic regression has established twelve 
household-level factors important in affecting 
households‟ likelihood to access microcredit, including 
household size, educational level, distance, income, 
assets value, being self-employed, economic 
dependency ratio, savings, official status, shareholding 
status, attitude towards debt, and access to alternative 
credit sources. Household income, self-employment 
and official status are three contributors to households‟ 
accessibility to microcredit because a higher credit 
demand resulting from the higher capital requirement 
(on/off farm), raises the likelihood of accessing 
microcredit by households. Conversely, household 
assets and savings can be used as proxies for household 
initial capital, and a higher value of either of them can 
potentially decrease the probability of accessing 
microcredit by the households. Households with large 
family size would be less likely to access microcredit 
programme due to the perceived low repayment 
capacity arising from the smaller future expected 
income per capita. Similarly, the probability of 
accessing microcredit would be substantially reduced if 
the households are averse to have debt or can access 
alternative credit sources.  
As documented in this study, the heterogeneous nature 
of rural households is essential in accounting for the 
differential opportunities of accessing microcredit, and 
therefore, simply expanding microcredit programmes 
in rural areas may be inadequate to increase credit 
access by the rural households. On the demand side, 
the limited credit access can be largely attributed to the 
low or lack of credit demand by the rural households 
for either agricultural production or off-farm activities, 
where the demand for credit is determined by a number 
of household-related factors such as those identified in 
this study. In addition, poor households have restricted 
access to microcredit because they effectively ration 
themselves out of the credit market for the reasons such 
as inability to provide collateral and low repayment 
ability arising from their poor wealth situations. One 
efficient way of facilitating households‟ access to 
microcredit is to encourage households to create 
investment opportunities in on/off farm activities (see 
Cheng, 2006). This will give rise to additional capital 
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requirement, which potentially increases households‟ 
demand for credit. 
In addition to the demand-side factors, our analysis 
indicates that the supply-side factors such as interest 
rates, documents requirement, and loan processing time 
cam impair households‟ access to microcredit. 
Therefore, microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as 
RCC should improve its micro lending policies (such 
as simplifying lending procedures) and re-design its 
micro loan products that allow for more flexible terms 
and conditions to better suit the diverse needs of the 
local rural households. These innovations (especially 
client-responsive loan products) are deemed to be more 
desirable by the poor whose living conditions are 
generally associated with uncertainty and vulnerability 
because these flexible services can help them better 
deal with risks and thus reduce vulnerability. Another 
observation in this study is that the households‟ 
inadequate access to microcredit can be due to their 
poor knowledge of RCC‟s microcredit programme. 
Thus, to improve households‟ accessibility to 
microcredit, there is an imperative for MFs to enhance 
promotion of their microcredit programmes among the 
rural households and make the households fully aware 
of the features of microcredit (e.g., collateral free). This 
can be done through village meetings (or social 
gatherings) and mass media such as radio and 
newspaper. 
The strong link between repayment capacity (perceived 
by the households) and access to microcredit indicates 
that increasing households‟ repayment capacity helps 
improve their access to microcredit. Hence, it is 
important for MFs to combine micro loans with other 
services or products that help improve the efficiency of 
loan use, which in turn helps build up the households‟ 
confidence in repaying loans. A useful service is to 
provide borrowing households with the evaluation of 
profitability of the loan-supported projects. Other 
services may include agricultural technical extension, 
off-farm business introduction and training in cash 
flow and risk management. 
Our findings indicate that informal credit plays an 
important role in meeting the credit needs of the 
Chinese rural households. This includes not only 
households who fail to obtain financial support through 
formal channels (such as RCC‟s microcredit 
programme), but also those who may be able to obtain 
formal credit but choose to borrow from informal 
lenders due to the potential merits of informal lenders 
(example, flexible lending schemes). This implies that 
the existence of informal finance may not simply be a 
result of insufficient supply of formal credit or credit 
rationing by formal institutions. It is likely that the 
different lending approaches adopted by formal and 
informal lenders make them cater to distinct groups of 
borrowers with various concerns. This is another main 
reason for the persistent co-existence of formal and 
informal finance in many developing countries 
including China.  
 
Policymakers in China should re-evaluate the role of 
informal financial sector in rural credit delivery and 
formulate new policies regarding the development of 
informal finance. For example, rather than trying to 
eliminate the informal finance, it would be more 
appropriate to reinforce the linkages between the 
formal and informal financial sectors in China. Better 
linkages between the two sectors enable one sector to 
overcome its own weaknesses by drawing from the 
other‟s strengths, such as banks can make use of the 
outreach and local knowledge of informal lenders 
while informal lenders can benefit from formal lenders‟ 
strong resource mobilisation ability and wide networks 
across the region. Consequently, strengthening the 
association between the formal and informal sectors 
helps expand credit delivery and improve the overall 
efficiency of the financial system, and hence, 
accelerates the development of China rural economy. 
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Table 1 Description of Variables Used in Logit Model 
 
Variable Name Variable Type Variable Description 
Demographics   
AGE Continuous  Age of household head (in years) 
GEND Binary  Gender of household head (1 = female, 0 = male) 
HHSZ Continuous  Household size (in numbers) 
EDU  Educational level of household head  
EDU1 Binary 1 = without education, 0 otherwise 
EDU2 Binary 1 = secondary school or less, 0 otherwise 
EDU3 Binary 1 = post-secondary education, 0 otherwise 
Socio-economics   
INCOME Continuous  Household annual income (in 1,000 yuan
a
) 
ASSET Continuous Total value of household assets
d
 (in 1,000 yuan) 
FARMSZ Binary  Size of household farmland (1 = 10 mus
b
 or less, 0 
otherwise) 
EDR Continuous Ratio of household members without income to household 
income earners 
SELFEMPL Binary Household head‟s involvement in self-employment (1 = 
yes, 0 otherwise) 
OFFICIAL Binary Family members working as village or township officials 
(1 = yes, 0 otherwise) 
SHAREHLD Binary Household owning shares of RCC (1 = yes, 0 otherwise) 
SAV Binary Household savings with RCC (1 = yes, 0 otherwise) 
Other variables   
LOCATN Binary Geographic location of household residence (1 = 
mountainous area, 0 otherwise) 
DIST  Distance between household residence and RCC branch 
office 
DIST1 Binary 1 = within 10 lis
c
, 0 otherwise 
DIST2 Binary 1 = between 11 and 20 lis, 0 otherwise 
DIST3 Binary 1 = more than 20 lis, 0 otherwise 
ALTER Binary Access to other credit sources (1 = yes, 0 otherwise) 
ATTITUD Binary Attitude towards debt (1 = averse, 0 otherwise) 
Notes: a. 1 US$ ≈ 6.8265 yuan; 
  b. mu is the common area measurement in rural China. 1 mu ≈ 0.067 ha; 
  c. li is the common distance measurement in rural China. 1 li ≈ 0.5 km 



















Table 2 Profile of the Respondents (Borrowers and Non-borrowers) 
 
 Non-Borrower Borrower All respondents Statistical  




% to N1 Count 
(n2) 
% to N2 Sub-total 
(N4=n1+n2) 
% to N4 
Demographics       
GEND       
Male 68 70.8 264 80.5 332 78.3 χ2 = 4.07** 
Female 28 29.2 64 19.5 92 21.7  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
EDU        
No education 10 10.4 6 1.8 16 3.8 χ2 = 17.183*** 
Secondary school or less 77 80.2 303 92.4 380 89.6  
Post secondary 9 9.4 19 5.8 28 6.6  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
AGE 41.02  41.28 41.22 t = -0.22 
HHSZ  4.18 4.16 4.17 t = 0.12 
Socio-economics        
SELFEMPL        
Yes 16 18.7 87 26.5 103 24.3 χ2 = 3.92** 
No 80 83.3 241 73.5 321 75.7  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
EDR (r)         
r<=1 80 83.3 254 77.4 334 78.8  
r>1 16 16.7 74 22.6 90 21.2  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Mean 0.84 0.90 0.4 t = -0.73 
INCOME (in yuan) 31,867 52,619 47,920 t = -1.19 
Main income sources        
Agriculture 77 80.2 246 75.0 323 76.2 χ2 = 3.76 
Non-agriculture 5 5.2 9 2.7 14 3.3  
Both 14 14.6 73 22.3 87 20.5  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
ASSET (in yuan) 13,667 12,278 12,592 t = 2.46
**
 
Land Holding Status        
Contracted 85 88.5 304 92.7 389 91.7 χ2 = 2.23 
Leased 11 11.5 24 7.3 35 8.3  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
FARMSZ (in mu)        
10 or less 83 86.5 233 71.0 316 74.5 χ2 = 9.30*** 
More than 10 13 13.5 95 29.0 108 25.5  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Other Characteristics        
LOCATN        
Mountainous 62 64.6 164 50.0 226 53.3 χ2 = 6.35** 
Non-mountainous 34 35.4 164 50.0 198 46.7  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
DIST (in li)        
1-10 51 53.1 205 62.5 256 60.4 χ2 = 13.97*** 
11-20 30 31.3 108 32.9 138 32.5  
>20 15 15.6 15 4.6 30 7.1  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
SAV        
Yes 59 61.5 139 42.4 198 46.7 χ2 = 10.86*** 
No 37 38.5 189 57.6 226 53.3  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
        
        
15 
Table 2 Profile of the Respondents (Cont) 
SHAREHLD        
Yes 29 30.2 63 19.2 92 21.7 χ2 = 5.29** 
No 67 69.8 265 80.8 332 78.3  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
OFFICIAL        
Yes 14 14.6 43 13.1 57 13.4 χ2 = 0.14 
No 82 85.4 285 86.9 367 86.6  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
ATTITUD        
aversion 54 56.3 79 24.1 133 31.4 χ2 = 35.69*** 
others 42 43.7 249 75.9 291 68.6  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
ALTER        
Yes 88 91.7 188 57.3 276 65.1 χ2 = 38.56*** 
No 8 8.3 140 42.7 148 34.9  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Note: Entries for variables AGE, HHSZ, INCOME and ASSET are mean values; 





















































AGE 0.0103 0.0191 0.2874 0.0011 
GEND -0.3710 0.3288 1.2726 -0.0437 
LOCATN -0.4565 0.4477 1.0398 -0.0392 
HHSZ -0.2262
*
 0.1356 2.7851 -0.0236 
FARMSZ 0.7010 0.4375 2.5667 0.0548 
SELFEMPL 0.7000
**
 0.3605 3.7672 0.0547 
EDR 0.5353
**
 0.2255 5.6339 0.0558 
INCOME (in 1,000 yuan) 0.0117
**
 0.0059 3.8842 0.0012 
ASSET (in 1,000 yuan) -0.0617
**
 0.0303 4.1265 -0.0064 
SAV -1.2124
***
 0.3624 11.1588 -0.1895 
ATTITUD -1.1050
***
 0.3046 13.1609 -0.1676 
ALTER -2.1137
***
 0.4512 21.9483 -0.1002 
OFFICIAL 1.0596
**
 0.4707 5.0668 0.0724 
SHAREHLD -1.0391
***
 0.3694 7.9128 -0.1544 
     
Dummy variables
3/
     
(DIST)     
DIST2 -0.2071 0.3162 0.4290 -0.0230 
DIST3 -1.4804
***
 0.5525 7.1785 -0.2495 
(EDU)     
EDU2 1.1641
*
 0.6811 2.9214 0.1797 
EDU3 0.6809 0.8935 0.5808 0.0536 
     
Constant 3.6876
**
 1.4357 6.5976  
     
McFadden R-squared    0.2878 
Log likelihood    -161.5214 
LR statistic    130.5594
***
 
Degree of Freedom    18 
Total observations    424 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 39 310 349 
% of correct 40.63 94.51 82.31 
No. of incorrect 57 18 75 
% of incorrect 59.38 5.49 17.69 
Note: 1/. Dependent variable=1 if household has accessed microcredit and zero otherwise; 
2/. Marginal effect is at the mean value. For binary variable, marginal effect is P|1-P|0; 
3/. To avoid multicollinearity problem, a dummy variable is dropped in each group. 
*,**,***, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
